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Abstract
Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete in-
formation on subjects’ behavior. This has rekindled the question whether “fair” behavior is
inspired by regard for others or is explained by external forces. To test for the importance
of external pressure we compare a standard double blind dictator game to a treatment
which provides no information about the source of dictator offers, and where recipients
do not even know that they participate in an experiment. We find no differences between
treatments. This suggests that those dictators who give are purely internally motivated,
as asserted by models of other-regarding preferences.
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Our misdeeds are easily forgotten when they are known only to ourselves.
Franc¸ois Duc de La Rochefoucauld (1664)
1 Introduction
Experimental studies have challenged the notion that human behavior can be well approxi-
mated with models assuming narrow self-interest. Strong evidence for other-regarding behavior
comes from dictator game experiments (Kahneman et al. (1986) and Forsythe et al. (1994)).
One player (dictator) decides on how to allocate an amount of money among himself and a
passive player (recipient). Narrow self-interest would call for the dictator to keep the entire
amount, leaving the recipient with nothing. Forsythe et al. (1994) find that 70% of the dicta-
tors actually do not grab the entire pie for themselves, leaving the recipient with on average
24% of the total amount. Similar patterns have been found in many different dictator game
settings (e.g., see the survey of Camerer (2003)).
But what is the source of seemingly altruistic behavior? The two fundamental views on this
ancient question are pitted against each other in Plato’s Republic. Glaucon claims that “[...]
a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually,
but of necessity, for whenever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust.”
He illustrates this with the tale of the shepherd Gyges, who finds a ring that enables him to
become invisible and act unjustly without anybody ever knowing. His brother Adeimantus
concurs saying that otherwise “[...] we should not have been on the watch to keep one another
from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watchman.” (Book II) In contrast,
Socrates claims that an individual who acts just for its own sake rather than for its appearance
is truly serving his own interest, justice being concerned “[...] not with the outward man, but
with the inward [...]” (Book IV).
This paper looks into whether external forces – concerns for the “outward man” – are
needed to motivate dictator giving or if internal mechanisms – concerns for the “inward man”
– are underlying such behavior. It has been argued that giving in dictator games might arise
from a desire of subjects to appear acting in a socially appropriate way because their individual
behavior is observed by others. Hoffman et al. (1994, p.349) suggest that ‘fairness’ may
not be “‘own’ preference, but a derivative of judgement by others.” Since subjects’ behavior
might also be influenced by expectations about the experimenter’s judgement, Hoffman et
al. (1994, 1996) run a double blind treatment (DB1) to ensure that the experimenter cannot
personally attribute subjects’ decisions. Incidence of positive offers (36% of dictators) and
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average donations (9.2% of pie) drop significantly relative to Forsythe et al. (1994). This
vindicates Glaucon and Adeimantus’ view that external enforcement of norms is important.
Reducing observability of actions along the dimension of increasing anonymity leads to less
seemingly other-regarding behavior.1
Nevertheless, 36% of the dictators in the DB1 experiment still donate some money. Does
this imply that these subjects have pure other-regarding preferences? Hoffman et al. (1994,
p.371) argue that the DB1 results “may approach the appropriate indicator of fairness as a
pure preference phenomenon.” However, there is another dimension of observability. Giving by
a dictator might not be driven by true regard for the recipient’s welfare but rather stem from
a desire to avoid that the recipient discovers the deed of violating a fairness norm (rather than
the perpetrator as an identifiable individual). Then, even in completely anonymous settings,
the regard by others would still serve as an external enforcement device of norms.
To our knowledge, none of the extant dictator game experiments addresses this issue. It
remains an open question whether such external enforcement is crucial, or if social norms can
be sustained via internal mechanisms only. Paraphrasing Adeimantus, are individuals effective
in policing themselves in completely anonymous situations? Does it matter for an individual in
such a setting that others are able to assess whether his or her actions conform to established
social norms or not?
Recent bargaining experiments provide some evidence that the observability of a proposer’s
action is an important driving force in seemingly altruistic behavior. Introducing an informa-
tion asymmetry about the pie size to be divided by the proposer, the typical finding is that
subjects are concerned about being perceived by others as abiding by fairness norms, even
under inter-subject anonymity, but otherwise exploit their informational advantage in a selfish
way.2 Gu¨th et al. (1996, p.597) conclude that “complying – at least superficially – with a
(fairness) norm has some intrinsic value: you feel better when others do not know how greedy
you are.”
Our dictator game experiment is designed to test directly for the importance of such exter-
1Dictator giving tends to increase when adding an additional observer (Cason and Mui (1997, ?)) or visual
cues in the form of stylized eyes that suggest being observed (Haley and Fessler 2005), and when weakening
anonymity across subjects (e.g., Bohnet and Frey (1999a, 1999b), Frohlich et al. (2001), and Burnham (2003)).
However, Bolton et. al (1998) find no significant experimenter anonymity effect.
2See Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993), Pillutla and Murnighan (1995), Straub and Murnighan (1995), Kagel
et al. (1996), Rapoport et al. (1996, 1996), Croson (1996), Gu¨th et al. (1996, 1997), and Kritikos and Bolle
(2002). Further evidence against intrinsic benefits from giving is that charities often receive donations just
sufficient to enter a publicized higher prestige donor category (Harbaugh 1998), possibly due to concerns for
direct or indirect reciprocity (Engelmann and Fischbacher 2003).
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nal enforcement of fairness norms, eliminating reputational and other strategic considerations
by guaranteeing experimenter anonymity and precluding any possibility for future interaction
between dictators and recipients. Treatments vary the information that recipients have. The
Aware Recipient treatment provides recipients with the dictator game instructions. Common
knowledge of the game enables recipients to become aware of being treated kindly or unkindly
by the dictators. Such knowledge by recipients is crucial for external enforcement to be effec-
tive. In contrast, it is irrelevant for dictator behavior if pure other-regarding preferences (or
any other internal mechanisms) are at work. Therefore, we compare behavior with that in the
Ignorant Recipient treatment, which provides no information to recipients about the source of
dictator offers. In fact, recipients do not even know that they participate in an experiment.
In all treatments, we control for experimenter anonymity by implementing the Hoffman et al.
(1994, 1996) procedure. To remove any possibility for future interaction between dictators and
recipients, recipients are randomly selected from UK phone directories to receive the dictators’
offers via mail.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
All experimental treatments follow the standard Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) procedure to
guarantee experimenter anonymity and instructions are kept as close as possible to the origi-
nal ones (see Appendix). In the Aware Recipient (AR) treatment each recipient receives the
instructions for the experiment along with the dictator’s offer. This corresponds to the stan-
dard dictator game setting and serves as a control treatment. In the Ignorant Recipient (IR)
treatment each recipient receives only the dictator’s offer without any indication where it came
from. The recipient is even unaware of taking part in an experiment.
It is crucial to exclude any possibility for future interaction between dictator subjects and
recipients to guarantee that the differential information treatments are credible. Therefore,
instead of using laboratory subjects, recipients are randomly selected from UK phone directo-
ries to receive by mail an envelope containing the dictator’s offer. Our AR treatment should
be an effective control because Johannesson and Persson (2000) show that this design feature
does not affect behavior in the standard Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) DB1 treatment.
Each session has 15 subjects who receive a show-up fee of £5 upon arrival and take a
seat in separate cubicles in the experimental lab, where a set of instructions is provided.
Subjects are asked to remain quiet during the session, instructions are read out loud and any
questions are answered. Then subjects draw a ballot to determine the monitor, who verifies
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that the instructions are carried out by the letter and receives an additional £10 for this.3 The
monitor randomly distributes 14 unmarked envelopes and retires to the back of the lab with
the experimenters. Twelve envelopes contain ten £1 coins and ten metal discs of corresponding
seize and weight, two envelopes contain only twenty metal discs.4 Subjects tear open these
envelopes and then decide how much money to place in the return envelope provided in their
cubicle. They are instructed to return a total of ten coins/metal discs, seal the envelope, and
place the remaining ten coins and discs in an identical envelope marked “Take this envelope
with you”.5 Subjects leave in an order that guarantees each individual privacy for his or her
decision. When leaving, subjects place the return envelope in a box next to the exit and take
the other envelope with them. Thereafter, the monitor opens the return envelopes, records
their contents, removes the discs, and places only the coins returned (if any) in a pre-addressed
envelope. Finally, the monitor and experimenter go to the nearest mail box and post the 14
letters.
The 14 recipients in the IR treatment are unaware of being part of an experiment and do
not know that some other person decided to allocate from a total of £10 to him or her the
amount found in the envelope. In contrast, in the AR treatment recipients become aware of
the fact that somebody else has decided to be kind to them or acted selfishly. Therefore, if
dictator giving is (partially) motivated by external enforcement of fairness norms, there should
be a higher fraction of people giving money and a higher average share of the pie for recipients
under the AR treatment than under the IR treatment. Otherwise, if dictator giving is purely
driven by internal mechanisms, there should be no behavioral differences between the AR and
IR treatments.
All experiments were conducted in the Experimental Lab of Royal Holloway College, Uni-
versity of London, in March and May 2005. We ran three sessions for each treatment to
generate 36 independent dictator observations per treatment (since in each session two dicta-
tor subjects received no money to distribute), recruiting subjects from all discipline areas of
the university (of the 42 non-monitor subjects only 8 in AR and 6 in IR had economics majors
or minors).
3We use such a ballot to convince subjects that we did not place a stooge among them who is then selected
as monitor.
4This guarantees that even if all subjects provided with coins return no money, the individual subjects’
decisions will not become known (Hoffman et al., 1994,1996).
5Both envelopes are padded so that it is impossible to tell apart by looking at them an envelope filled with
ten coins/discs even from an unfilled one.
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of dictator offers
3 Results
In the AR treatment, the number of people who kept the entire endowment was 21 (58%) and
recipients received 10.3% of the pie on average. In the IR treatment, the number of people who
kept the entire endowment was 23 (64%) and the average share received by the recipients was
9.4%. These results are virtually identical and a chi-square test, based on the proportion of
people who give zero and the proportion of people who give a positive amount, unsurprisingly
yields no significant differences between treatments (χ2 = 0.23, df = 1, p > 0.5).
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of dictators’ choices. Again, AR and IR are
rather similar. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for differences between distributions are insignificant
(Z = 0.281, p = 0.86). These results clearly reject the hypothesis that external enforcement
matters.
Figure 1 also reveals that there are no obvious differences between our treatments and the
results in Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996). In DB1, 23 subjects (64%) kept the whole money
endowment and 9.2% was given to recipients on average. Both of our treatments are very
similar to these results and differences are not statistically significant. We conclude that our
AR double blind procedure replicates the DB1 results and is consistent with Johannesson and
Persson’s (2000) results.6
The result that the IR and AR treatments do not differ provides evidence that fairness
norms can be effectively sustained by internal mechanisms. More than one third of the dictators
6Results in Johannesson and Persson (2000) are not directly comparable because dictators choose from a
different set of possible allocations.
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gave positive amounts, and these subjects offered 25% of the pie on average. Moreover, in the
IR treatment 3 out of the 36 subjects gave 40% or 50% of their endowment. This replicates
both Hoffman et al.’s (1994, 1996) DB1 (3/36) and our AR (4/36) treatments. The fact that
this frequency does not change across our treatments suggests that such dictators truly have
other-regarding preferences. Suppose subjects felt that fairness norms call for dictators to
give 50%. In the AR treatment recipients can immediately verify compliance with such a
norm. In contrast, in the IR treatment recipients are completely unaware of the pie size and
therefore have no obvious reference point against which to judge the offer. Therefore, external
motivation for not violating this norm has no bite. If dictators still give half of the endowment,
we can conclude that this decision is consistent with their true preferences.
We finally discuss whether our procedures might have biased the results. We kept very
closely to the Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) design and instructions. In our experiments, there
was no evidence that dictators gave money as a result of an error. Typically, no questions were
asked and even fine points in the instructions appeared to have been understood by all. For
example, without exception subjects returned a total of ten coins/metal discs in their envelope,
as instructed. Moreover, we took extreme care in avoiding credibility of design issues (Frohlich
et al. (2001)) by selecting the monitor publicly (see footnote 3) and ensuring complete privacy
of decisions through the use of separated cubicles and padded envelopes.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Recent experiments on dictator and ultimatum games have demonstrated a substantial im-
pact of anonymity and incomplete information on subjects’ behavior. This has rekindled the
question whether we follow social norms because we truly care for others, or instead because
we are worried about the regard by others.
The experiment reported in this paper addresses the issue whether giving in completely
anonymous dictator games is internally motivated or whether external pressure helps enforce
fairness norms. To this end, we remove a crucial element of observability of the dictators’
actions; recipients do not receive the experimental instructions and, in fact, do not even know
they participate in an experiment. Moreover, we guarantee credibility of the one-shot nature
of the game and the informational treatments by eliminating through an anonymous mail-out
scheme any possibility for future interaction between dictators and recipients.
In both treatments, roughly one third of the dictator subjects give positive amounts, leav-
ing the recipients with roughly 10% of the pie (as in the Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) DB1
experiment). Once complete anonymity is assured, it does not matter for dictator behavior
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whether recipients are aware of being treated kindly or unkindly.
This result puts into perspective recent bargaining experiments, which show that subjects
tend to exploit information asymmetries to engage in more selfish behavior when this does
not become apparent to other subjects. The fact that information about the game provided
to recipients has no impact in our completely anonymous setting suggests that those dictators
who give are not driven by external pressure but are internally motivated to do so. These
internal mechanisms include pure regard for others (as stipulated in models of other-regarding
preferences), a warm glow of decision making (Andreoni 1989), a desire to maintain a positive
self impression (Murnighan et al. (2001)) or to avoid feelings of guilt. The latter point has
been succinctly framed by Kandel and Lazear (1992, p.806) in the context of sustaining work
norms via peer pressure:7 “Guilt is internal pressure, whereas shame is external pressure. In
the context of the firm, the important issue is observability. A worker feels shame when others
can observe his actions. Without observability, only guilt can be an effective form of pressure.”
Our experimental results suggest that when strategic considerations are eliminated it does
not matter to an individual how his or her actions are perceived by others. Thus, it appears
to be justified to model bargaining phenomena as based on internal mechanisms, as captured
by other-regarding preferences, eliminating the need to enrich models to allow for preferences
to depend on judgement by others.
Appendix: Instructions
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. For your participation today
we have paid you £5 in cash. You may earn an additional amount of money in cash.
We ask you to remain silent during the entire experiment; if you have any questions, please
raise your hand.
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a person whose address was randomly
selected from the BT phone directories for the UK. You will not be told who that person is
either during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who you are.
You will notice that there are other people in the same room with you who are also
participating in this experiment. You will not be paired with any of these people.
One of the persons in this room will be chosen to be the monitor for today’s experiment.
The monitor will be paid £10 in addition to the £5 already paid. The monitor will be in charge
7These concepts of guilt and shame are borrowed from sociology and have also been used by psychologists
(e.g., Gehm and Scherer (1988, p.74)). It should be noted though that they contrast with Lewis (1971)’s
reconceptualization of these terms which psychologists often follow (e.g., Tangney and Dearing (2002)).
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of the envelopes explained below. In addition, the monitor will verify that the instructions
have been followed as they appear here.
The experiment is conducted as follows: Fourteen unmarked envelopes have been placed
in a box. Twelve of these envelopes contain ten 1£ pound coins and ten metal discs. The
remaining two envelopes contain 20 metal discs. The monitor will hand each person in the
room one of these sealed filled envelopes. The person will then open the envelope privately
inside the cubicle. Only the person who was given the envelope will know what the envelope
contains.
Each person in this room will find inside the cubicle two empty padded envelopes, one
of which is unmarked and the other is marked “Take this envelope with you”. Each person
must decide how many coins (if any) and how many discs to put into the unmarked padded
envelope. The number of coins plus the number of discs must add up to 10. The person then
puts the remaining coins and discs into the envelope marked “Take this envelope with you”.
Examples:
1. Put £2 and 8 discs into the unmarked padded envelope, put the remaining £8 and 2
discs into the other padded envelope.
2. Put £9 and 1 disc into the unmarked padded envelope, put the remaining £1 and 9 discs
into the other padded envelope.
These are examples only, the actual decision is up to each person.
If the envelope handed out by the monitor has 20 discs, put 10 discs into the unmarked
padded envelope and the other 10 into the other padded envelope.
This is done in private and we ask that you tell no one of your decision. Notice that each
unmarked padded envelope returned will look exactly the same. Also note that no one else,
including the experimenter, will know the personal decisions of the people in this room.
Once you have made your decision you will seal your unmarked padded envelope. When
called upon, leave the cubicle, place it in the box marked “return envelopes” and then leave
the room taking along with you the envelope marked “Take this envelope with you”.
After all 14 unmarked padded envelopes have been returned, the monitor will be given
another box. This box is marked “addresses” and contains 14 envelopes with a stamp. Each
of these envelopes has the address of a person randomly selected from the BT phone directories
for the UK. This person does not know anything about the experiment. In fact, this person
does not even know that he or she is participating in an experiment. He or she will simply
receive the envelope without any explanation and without any indication where the envelope
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comes from. The person will be sent a copy of these instructions but no further explanation.
[AR-treatment] There will be no return address and your identity will remain anonymous.
The monitor will then choose one envelope from the box with “return envelopes” and record
its content. The monitor will put the money from this envelope into the envelope from the
box “addresses” and seal it. Each addressed envelope will contain only the amount of money
found in the return envelope (that is, £0 to £10), without any explanation [IR-treatment] and
a copy of these instructions [AR-treatment]. The monitor will continue until all the envelopes
have been opened. The monitor will then take the 14 sealed envelopes and, together with the
experimenter, go to the closest mailbox and mail the envelopes. The experiment is then over.
For today’s experiment, you will not have to sign a receipt for the money you received.
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